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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF WEATHER
MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES: PERIL OR POLICY?
J. W. SAMUELS'
Some months ago, newspapers reported a statement by Dr. Werhner
von Braun, long the head of the United States space program, in
which this scientist predicted that within 25 years man will be able to
control the weather to the extent that the sun would shine all day and
rain only at night if this was desired. This was one of the possible
benefits of the space program. In another report, the press suggested
that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had tried rainmaking over the Ho Chi Minh trail of Southern Laos in an effort to hinder
North Vietnamese truck movements. The suggestion was vigorously
denied by official sources.
These two very recent reports catch vividly the present weather
modification situation-tremendous promise coupled with great
potential for harmful use. The blessing and the curse. Much has
already been written on the technological possibilities,' and it is
unnecessary to repeat the tale here. But too little has been done by
way of preparation for the international legal complications which
this technology may present. 2 In this paper we will look at some of
*Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario.
1. At present, the operations contemplated include rainmaking, fogclearing, hail suppression, and storm modification or dispersal. See M. Neiburger, Artificial Modification of ClouAs
and Precipitation (World Meteorological Organization, Technical Note No. 105, W. M. 0. No.
249. TP. 137, 1969); Roberts, The State of the Art in Weather Modfication, Weather Modification
and the Law 1-21, (H. J. Taubenfeld ed. 1968); National Science Foundation, Weather
Modification, 10th Annual Report, NSF 69-18 (1968); Fleagle, Background and Present Status of
Weather Modification, Weather Modification-Science and Public Policy 3-17 (R. Fleagle ed.
1969); Hobbs, The Physics of Natural PrecipitationProcesses, Weather Modification-Science
and Public Policy 18-29 (R. Fleagle ed. 1969); The Scientific Basis, Techniques and Results of
Cloud Modification, Weather Modification-Science and Public Policy 30-42 (R. Fleagle ed.
1969); Sutcliffe, Artificial Modification of Weather and Climate, 12 Int'l. Rel. 787 (1965); Malone,
Weather, Toward the Year 2018, 71-74, (For Pol. Ass'n. ed 19
Halacy, The Weather
Changers (1968); 1 Weather and Climate Modification-Problems and Prospects (Summary and
Recommendation), Final Report of the Panel on Weather and Climate Modification to the
Committee on Atmospheric Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council
(N.A.S.-N.R.C., Pub. No. 1350, 1966). For an extensive bibliography on the technological
possibilities, see Human Dimensions of Weather Modification 409-12, (W. Sewell ed. 1966).
2. There is a great deal that has been written on the national approach to control of weather
modification. See Howe, Legal Moguls: Ski Areas, Weather Modificationand the Law, 33 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 59 (1971); Hearing on Weather Modification Before the House Comm. on Science and
Astronautics, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearing on Weather Modification before the
Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964); McLaren, Weather Modification and the Law, 34 Sask. L. Rev. 1 (1969);
W. Sewell, ed., supra note 1, at 279-88, 289-303, 329-344; Who Owns the Clouds, 1 Stan. Law
Rev. 43 (1948); Artificial Rainmaking 1 Stan. L. Rev. 508 (1949); Satterfield, Legal Problems of
Weather Control, 12 Baylor L. Rev. 113 (1960); Ball, Shaping the Law of Weather Control, 58
Yale L.J. 213 (1949); Frenzen, Weather Modification: Law and Policy, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 503 (1971); Corbridge and Moses, Weather Modification: Law and Administration, 8
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the legal principles and mechanisms which may be used in building
an appropriate international framework to cope with weather modification activities in the future. It may well be too soon to build the
framework because its structure will depend on the actual developments which take place. This should not prevent an active discussion
now of the international legal possibilities. In the end we may suggest
certain action which can be taken now in the light of the existing
state of the art and international relations.
It is important to make it clear that this paper will be concerned
only with intentional weather modification. The means of control
necessary for inadvertant weather-changing are of an entirely different order from those applicable to intentional activities. The
weather and climate are affected by urbanization, air transport,
industrial discharge, and so on. These processes do not lend themselves to control in the same way that intentional weather
modification does. At the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, one of the specific recommendations was the establishment of a world-wide network of at least 110 atmospheric monitoring
stations to keep watch on changes that might lead to climate
modification.
PRINCIPLES
A. Peaceful Purposes
The most obvious first principle of the international control of
Natural Resources J. 207 (1968), reprinted in Environmental L. Rev. 109 (1970); Johnson, Legal
Implication of Weather Modification at 76-102, Weather Modification and the Law (H.
Taubenfeld ed. 1968); Davis, Special Problems of Liability and Water Resources Law at 103-140,
Weather Modfication and the Law (H. Taubenfeld ed. 1968); Davis, Special Problems of
Liability and Water Resources Law, Weather Modification and the Law (H. Taubenfeld ed.
1968); Mann, Proposals for Federal Control of Weather Modification Activities, Weather
Modification and the Law 141-162 (H. Taubenfeld ed. 1968); R. Fleagle ed., supra note 1, at
118-37. On the other hand, the international control of weather modification has received little
attention. Most of the writing hints at international complications arising out of weather
changing activities, and makes brief suggestions for control. See Taubenfeld, Weather Modification and Control: Some International Legal Implications, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 493 (1967); the
foregoing was largely reproduced and then somewhat expanded upon in H. Taubenfeld and R.
Taubenfeld, The International Implications of Weather Modification Activities (Office of
External Research, U.S. Department of State, June 1968); Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Some
InternationalImplications of Weather Modification Activities, 23 Int'l Organization 808 (1969).
See also Hassett, Weather Modification And Control: International OrganizationalProspects, 7
Texas Int'l L.J. 89 (1971); David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Principles
Governing Certain Changes in the Environment of Man; David Davies Memorial Institute of
International Studies, Draft Rules Concerning Changes in the Environment of the Earth.
One detailed proposal for international control was set out in J. Samuels Draft Protocol on
Weather Modification (World Peace Through Law Center, Geneva, Pamphlet Series, No. 15,
(1971), prepared for, and adopted in principle at, The Belgrade Conference on World Peace
Through Law, July, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Draft Protocol]. The Draft Protocol was discussed
in Samuels InternationalControl of Weather Modification Activities, Canadian Perspectives on
International Law (forthcoming).
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weather modification activities is that, if possible, they should be
restricted to peaceful purposes. This would follow the treatment of
the reservation of
many new technological possibilities-for instance,
3
outer space and the seabed for peaceful purposes.
There are two problems with this principle. In the first place, it can
be argued that we need to make weapons more humane. If possible,
when the use of force is necessary, it may be desirable to make use of
force which does not depend for its effectiveness upon the destruction
of persons and property. Is it not better to stop the North Vietnamese
trucks by rainmaking rather than by bombing? Might it not be better
to win a war by depriving a people of their sunshine for a prolonged
period of time rather than gunning them down in the streets?
Questions such as these bring into doubt the very need for this
possible first principle. Of course, one answer is that if weather
modification was used as a weapon, it would not be instead of other
means but in addition to them; and we might as well not permit this
addition.
The second problem here is to draw the line between military uses
and peaceful uses. The standard question is: would fog-clearing over a
military base (to enable military craft to fly missions) be a peaceful
use or not? A response is that only use of weather modification directly
as a weapon would be "non-peaceful". But then one sees little
difference between the fog-clearing over one's own base and the
rain-making over the enemy's base. One approach might be to
enshrine the concept of peaceful use now and worry about its
practical delimitation as actual developments occur. This would
follow the trend of declaration-first-treaty-later used so frequently in
modern international law-making.
B. Permissible Uses
Apart from the fundamental issue of peaceful versus military use,
within the category of peaceful use there is a host of questions raised.
What happens when the farmer wants rain and his neighbor, the
resort owner, wants sunshine? Or, the city needs rain to replenish its
3. See Declararion of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR (1963); Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, annexed to G.A. Res. 2222, 21 U.N. GAOR, (Dec. 19, 1966). Concerning
the seabed, it is premature perhaps to say that it has been reserved for peaceful purposes, but
see the declaration adopted as a result of the Maltese proposal, G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U. N. GAOR
(1967); and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
annexed to G.A. Res. 2660, 25 U.N. GAOR (1971); 10 Int'l Legal Materials 146 (1971). The
"Conference on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction" is still in the preparatory stage, but should be on for 1974 or 1975. At that
time it will be clearer whether the seabed is to be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.
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water supply but the neighboring crop needs a dry spell? And, most
importantly, what if the the farmer and the city are in one country
while the resort owner and the crop are in another? What if rain in
one area will increase the food yield but wipe out certain kinds of
wildlife necessary elsewhere?
In the Draft Protocol on Weather Modification, I suggested that
operations be permitted where, upon a balancing of the forecasted4
benefits and detriments, there would be betterment for mankind.
Obviously this is a simplistic concept. But its nature is an expression
of the difficulty of precision here. What are the criteria against which
we judge the potential benefits and losses? In the 1970's it is no longer
good enough to weigh the economic plusses and minusses. The quality
of life, rather than the quantity of life, is important. And quality is an
elusive thing, composed, as it is, of cultural, social, economic,
aesthetic and other factors in different mixes depending upon the
individual or group whose life is being considered. The best that we
can do now is make clear that decisions concerning weather
modification operations, with potential consequences which transcend
national frontiers, take into account this multiplicity of factors.
A much more difficult problem arises out of the uncertainty which
surrounds this new technology. The Sixth Congress of the World
Meteorological Organization, convened in April, 1971, endorsed a
statement concerning weather modification which includedIt is important to emphasize that weather modification is still
largely in the research stage. For this reason, operational efforts
should be undertaken only after the most careful study of the
particular situation by experts and with the understanding
that
5
the desired end results may not always be achieved.
We are still at the stage where it is difficult to predict what will
happen if an operation is carried out and assess what did happen once
it's over. If this is so, how do we handle the question of whether or not
to permit a particular operation? The range of legal possibilities runs
4. Draft Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 10, 1,
5. This same caution is sounded elsewhere. Neiburger, supra note 1, at 28: "In the case of
precipitation augmentation and hail suppression, it is not known under which circumstances
and by what techniques operations will lead to success, and when opposite effects will result."
In particular, there is uncertainty in the case of large scale changes. See Weather and Climate
Modification-Problemsand Prospects,supra note 1, at 8:
It can be stated categorically that there is, at present, no known way deliberately
to induce predictable changes in the very large scale features of climate or
atmospheric general circulation. While man may attain the technological
capability to induce perturbations sufficient to trigger massive atmospheric
reactions, we cannot now predict with certainty all the important consequences
of such acts. As long as our understanding is thus limited, to embark on any vast
experiment in the atmosphere would amount to gross irresponsibility.
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from granting the green light so long as there is no reasonable (or
possible) chance of unexpected adverse effects, to maintaining a
presumption of harm until the operator proves that no unexpected
adverse effects will occur. We are now so very aware of the ecological
balance, the interdependence of earth processes, that perhaps our bias
ought to lean towards the presumption of harm. 6 The weather is
obviously critical. Upon it depends our food supply, our natural light,
and much else. There is an innate tendency to draw back from
tampering with it when there is uncertainty. The potential harmful
consequences are catastrophic.
C. MultinationalDecision-Making
Where the effects of the weather modification operation will not
be confined within the frontiers of one State, the decision concerning
its permissibility ought to be made by a body on which there is
international representation. The interdependence within the ecosystem, which recognizes no national boundaries, must be reflected in
the decision-making process.
The most difficult question here is whether or not all weather
modification ought to be subject to international decision on the
ground that any operation must, in the end, have international
consequences. If this is not done, then what degree of possibility must
there be that there will be significant effect beyond the borders of one
state, before the decision must be an international one? It is probably
fair to say that in the present international system, States would not
consent to international decision-making for all weather mofification
operations. Therefore, some agreement will have to be reached on the
type of activity which can be undertaken by a State without
international consultation.
This problem of the degree to which the unity of the earth cycle
will be recognized in law also crops up when we consider the range of
interests that ought to be represented in the decision-making process.
If the United States wishes to conduct rain-making experiments along
6. This point was made at the Belgrade Conference on World Peace Through Law, July
1971, by Professor Daniel Wilkes, then of the Institute for Man and His Environment, University
of Massachusetts, and finds expression in Hassett, supra note 2, at 116.
In Draft Rules, supra note 2, § 2 provides:
Subject to the provisions of Section 3, no state or international body shall engage
in, or within the limits of its authority permit, operations which can cause

changes in the environment of the Earth:
1. if the range and scale of these changes
precision; . . .
Section 3.1 then provides for reference to "an
competence, who shall express a reasoned opinion
Earth which the operation is likely to cause."
unpredictable, Section 3.3 calls for reference of the

cannot be predicted with reasonable
international group of scientists of known
as to the changes in the environment of the
And, if this group considers the changes
matter to the UN.
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the U.S.-Canada border, it is obvious that Canada will be affected and
should be included in the decision-making process. But do the
European or Asian States also have an interest? It seems arguable
that there will be effects of such an operation which will be felt
around the world, to a greater or lesser extent. Again, a look at the
current international system foretells little success in achieving
human cooperation to match that of nature. We shall have to content
ourselves with a decision-making process which takes into account at
least those international interests which will be affected demonstrably
by a proposed weather modification operation.
D. Liability of Operators
Initially, two questions face us here. First, should there be any
limitation on the liability of the operator when damage results from
his weather modification? Second, are there any unforeseen occurrences which might excuse liability?
With respect to the first question, it seems unlikely that we can
hold to a standard of full financial responsiblity for fault. The
potential damage if a weather modification operation went awry is
enormous. No single operator could begin to bear the loss if there was
a major accident. Furthermore, no insurer will place himself on risk
to such an extent where the situation is so uncertain. As in the fields of
nuclear use 7 and oil transport, 8 we may have to content ourselves
with a limitation on liability which provides somewhat adequate
compensation for those who suffer the damage, and sufficient
deterrent to prevent sloppy practices, but, at the same time, which
does not rob the venture of all economic feasibility. Of course,
combined with operator liability, there could be some form of
national and international compensation scheme which we shall say
more of later.
With respect to the question of unforeseen circumstances, in many
areas, operators are excused of liability when damage results from
their activities because of some unforeseen occurrence such as an
7. See Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Art. 7 (July
1960); Supplementary Convention, Arts. 3 & 4 (Jan. 1963); Vienna Convention on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage, Art. 5 (1963); Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear
Ships, Art. 3 (May, 1962). Texts of these agreements may be found in Appendix to Street &
Frame, Law Relating to Nuclear Energy (1966).
8. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Art. 5 (Nov.
1969) text at 64 Am. J. Int'l. L. 481, 482 (1970); Tanker Owners' Volutary Agreement
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) Art. 6, (Jan. 1969), text at 8 Int'l Legal
Materials 497, 500 (1969); Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), (Jan. 1971), text at 10 Int'l Legal Materials 137 (1971); IMCO
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, Art 4(4), (Dec. 1971), text at 11 Int'l Legal Materials 284 (1972).
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earthquake, other Act of God, war, and so on. For instance, if it could
be shown that a weather modification operation would have been
harmless, except that during its performance an unforeseen
earthquake occurred and this triggered off a violent weather reaction
which caused considerable damage, should the operator bear responsibility? There are two approaches. On the one hand, several
international instruments have excused liability in such circumstances
on the ground that the most that can be expected of an operator is
that he take all necessary precautions to avoid foreseeable damage. 9
On the other hand, there is the approach found in the Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which may serve as a model
for environmental legislation elsewhere. In this Act, the operator is
liable regardless of these unforeseen circumstances on the ground that
carriage of oil through Arctic water is an inherently dangerous
activity and nothing is really an unforeseen occurrence. 10 Similarly,
particularly in view of the current technological uncertainties in the
field of weather modification, it could be argued that changing the
weather is an inherently dangerous activity and no so-called unforeseen circumstances should excuse liability.
There is yet another consideration here. What standard of proof
should be required to engage an operator's responsibility? Given the
great difficulty now of really knowing what will occur and what has
occurred as the result of a weather modification operation, we place a
very heavy burden on the injured party by having him prove
responsibility. On the other hand, it may be too onerous on operators
to presume responsibility until proved otherwise. This is perhaps one
of our most intractable problems, and will remain so, until we have
the scientific capability to analyze weather phenomena far better
than we do now. 1
E. State Responsibility
Where the State itself does not undertake an operation, it is unclear,
under present international law, to what extent the State is responsible for activities which take place within its frontiers and have
effects elsewhere.' 2 By and large, historically the question has arisen
9. Paris Convention, supra note 7, at Art. 9; Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at Art. 4(3);
Brnssels Convention, supra note 7 at Art 8; International Convention, supra note 8, at Art. 3(2).
10. Can. Rev. Stat. c.2, s.7(1), Ist Supp. (1970).
11. The problems involved in proving the effects of weather modification are discussed in
Morris, Preparationand Trial of Weather Modificationand Litigation,Weather Modification and
the Law 163-184 (H. Taubenfeld ed., 1968).
12. See J. Starke, An Introduction to InternationalLaw 306 (7th Ed., 1972):
Where the illegal acts are committed by private citizens and not by an organ or
official of the State the grounds for not imputing liability to the State are much
stronger, for the doctrine of imputability rests on the assumption that the
delinquency has been committed by an agency at least of the State concerned.
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only over situations where people in one State foment rebellion in
another or launch armed attacks into another. In the environmental
field, the leading international precedent is the Trail Smelter Case in
which it was held that "no State has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence."' 13
There are three aspects of this statement of law. First, it is
restricted to injury by fumes. However, it is probably fair to say that
this restriction reflects the particular facts of the case itself and was
not meant to circumscribe the concept in a general way. Thus, this
first point is not critical. Second, the prohibition is only operative
where the case is of serious consequence. Exactly how one draws the
line between serious and non-serious situations is unclear; but it is
certain that the Trail Smelter principle contemplates the right of a
State to permit its territory to be used in such a manner to cause
injury to a neighbor so long as the injury is not serious. A little harm is
permissible. Third, a State's responsibility is engaged only where
there is clear and convincing evidence of injury (and clearly this was
intended to mean both the damage and the responsibility).
If the Trail Smelter statement is applied in the weather modification field, there are some complications. They arise from the
uncertainty of the science. Because of the difficulty of analyzing
weather phenomena, it is probable that States will balk at permitting
any injury on their territory arising out of weather modification
operations conducted in a neighboring State. The possibility of great
harm will prompt great caution. In addition, it would not be feasible
today to call for clear and convincing evidence of injury arising out of
weather modification activities.
While the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
held in Stockholm in early June, 1972, did not deal at length directly
with the question of weather modification, the Declaration on the
Human Environment contained two principles relevant here. Concerning state responsibility, the Declarationreads:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environBut here again, by their omissions, or default, the agencies of the State may have
broken some independent duty of international law, and liability may then be
imputed to the State.
13. 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941).
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ment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national
14
jurisdiction.
Insofar as State responsibility extends to liability for operations
within its frontiers, the Declarationsays:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution
and other environmental damage caused by activities within the
jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.15
As has been mentioned already, it is unclear that these principles
are statements of existing public international law. Furthermore, the
Declaration per se has no binding effect as law. This is so, first,
because of the very nature of this sort of instrument in international
law; and, second, because in this particular case, a large number of
states refused to participate in the Conference and therefore did not
subscribe to the Declaration. The Soviet Union, and most other
Eastern-European countries, stayed away on the ground that the
German Democratic Republic was not allowed to take part in the
Conference as a full participant. However, as the Secretary-General
of the Conference pointed out, the fundamental task of the gathering
was not to make new law, but to take politicaldecisions that will lead
to environmental cooperation. 16 Thus, we may see these two principles of state responsibility turned into lex lata as legal developments
in this area progress.
One further issue in the area of state responsibility is whether or
not a State bears some obligation in respect of operations conducted
off its territory but by its nationals. In other words, we can
contemplate with ease a State's territorialresponsibility, but does it
also bear some personal responsibility? Perhaps the key point is that
there ought to be State responsibility for operations conducted on
territory not subject to the sovereignty of any State, and the
responsibility is best placed upon the State to which the operator
belongs. Thus, weather modification activities over the high seas
would be the responsibility of the State whose national conducts the
operations.
What has been said so far concerning responsibility deals with the
situation where the State itself does not undertake the operations. Of
course, where the government or its agent is the operator, there is no
14. The only quasi-official source I have of this declaration is the press release (HE/ 78/Rev. 1,
June 19, 1972) put out by the Conference Secretariat. The principle quoted appears at 3 of this
release.
15. Id.
16. Id., at 1.
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doubt that the State bears responsibility for the harm which occurs in
neighboring territories.
F. InternationalCommunity Responsibility
It is critical to bear in mind that it is not only harmful
consequences which transcend international frontiers, but benefits as
well. Because this is so, we have the question of the extent to which
those who benefit should bear the obligation of compensating those
who suffer harm. It is unfair perhaps to ask that the operator, or the
State which has responsibility for his action, bear the whole obligation. The fact that benefits transcend frontiers should be reflected in
the law by distributing the responsibility of compensation.
Such a concept can be handled in either of two ways. On one hand,
the matter could be left to ad hoc settlement. Once a weather
modification operation was completed, one could determine who
benefitted, who suffered, and the relative gains and losses. Then,
calculate the portion of the compensation to be paid by each of those
who benefitted and the payments to be made to those who suffered.
However, ad hoc systems suffer from excessive delay and uneven
treatment of similar cases. Therefore, another way to deal with the
problem of international compensation would be to establish an
international fund out of which claims could be paid. Contributions to
the fund could be made on the basis of a number of factors,
including-gross national product, weather modification activity,
potential and actual gains and losses, and so on.
Of course, whichever method is chosen, there is still the whole
range of problems of procedure-how is liability determined? How is
the fund administered? These issues will be touched upon in the
second part of this paper, which deals with methods of control.
Suffice it now to mention the interconnection between the principle
of international compensation and the means of administration.
METHODS OF CONTROL
A. Total Prohibition
Given the uncertainty which surrounds the present technology of
weather modification, it has been suggested that we prohibit such
operations altogether. Such a suggestion comes from fundamentalists
who want no tampering with the work of God, and from persons
concerned that shifting the balance in one of its essential parts will
have enormous adverse effects on the whole ecosystem. These fears
are not groundless.
Nonetheless, it seems overcautious to say that, even though the
remedial possibility is there, we ought to leave all deserts barren or
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water-hungry cities dry or hurricanes to ravage urban areas unabated.
Much of our current hesitation arises out of looking back at the misuse
of science in the past. We are at a point of reappraisal. Unless we
decide that man is incapable of using his science wisely, a careful
encouragement of needed weather modification is merited.
Perhaps, in the short-run, total prohibition of weather modification
activities with potential significant international consequences would
be advisable. In this way we could avoid the international tension
which is bound to result from such operations.' 7 But, as technology
improves, the prohibition ought to be relaxed. In any event, it is
probably the case that States would not abide a total prohibition
where they feel an urgent need for weather modification and the
potential is there. Thus, we ought to bear in mind the desirability of
practical measures of control, a consideration which argues against a
total prohibition forever.
B. InternationalStandards Only
At the outset, we may content ourselves with a declaration or
agreement establishing international standards to be followed by
States in their weather-changing programs. The matters to be dealt
with in such a declaration or agreement would include:
-a prohibition of weather modification operations where there is
a real possibility of international harm, or where the results are
uncertain;
-an obligation to consult those neighboring States that would
experience substantial effects from an operation for which a State
bears responsibility;
and States for
-a statement concerning the liability of operators
18
damage resulting from weather operations.
If the standards are set out in a declaration, it is realized that such
declarations have little or no legal effect in themselves. However,
current practice, in fields where new technology is being subjected to
a legal regime, shows a willingness to engage in this getting-the-toeswet step before the full plunge into binding legal obligation. The
benefits of this first step are several: first, it evidences an awareness of
international concern and a desire to act within the international
framework; second, it encourages further steps; third, where nonbinding standards are established, it begins a process of harmonization of activity which lends itself to later binding legislation. Once
States are doing these things on a "voluntary" basis, they are much
17. See Taubenfeld, supra note 2.
18. See Hassett, supra note 2, at 116.
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more willing to undertake a legal obligation to do what they are
already doing.
There are two ways in which these standards could be established.
On the one hand, they might be set out in full at the time of the initial
declaration or agreement. Or, some mechanism may be established to
enable the addition of more precise standards as technology advances
and as the international willingness to abide by rules increases. If this
latter system is chosen, it is very likely that the existing World
Meteorological Organization could assume a role here.
If the standards are set out in an agreement, then there is already a
legal obligation established and the question of enforcement arises
should there be infractions. In an area fraught with such scientific
uncertainty as is weather modification, it would probably be best in
the beginning to leave enforcement to the existing mechanisms rather
than creating some new system. Thus, we have the range from
consultation to reference to the International Court of Justice, with
frequent use of the UN framework. As technology develops, and we
achieve the ability to determine accurately the effects of a weather
modification program, it may be advisable to establish a specialized
scientific panel to deal with the problems of enforcement of the
international standards. This would involve, inter alia, establishing
liability for damage caused as a result of breach of the standards.
C. InternationalSupervision
Carrying the international control system one step further, we
could have international supervision of the standards already established. This supervision could take a variety of forms. Some of the
more promising possibilities are:
-the obligation to report on weather modification activities to
some international supervisory body;
-these reports could be examined by a group of specialists who
may or may not have the right to request additional information;
-there could be international observation of operations to ensure
that the standards were being met.
The teeth in such a supervisory system would come from the
publicity attendant upon the scrutiny given to operations by an
international body. Combined with the power to oversee operations,
there could be a right in the body to make suggestions for improvement to the operator to bring his practices more closely into line with
the international standards.
The World Meteorological Organization already provides us with
an acquired expertise in this field, and it is natural that we look to it
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first as the body to act in the supervisory role. It would be possible to
amend the Convention of the WMO to give the Organization the
powers necessary to supervise weather modification activities.
D. InternationalLicensing System
At yet a higher level of international cooperation, we could
establish an international licensing system. Weather modification
operations could not be undertaken without a license granted by some
international body.
If such a system were contemplated, the first problem is over what
operations the procedure should have jurisdiction. Do we want all
programs to be subject to the international licensing scheme? Perhaps
this is going a bit too far. One suggestion would be to require the
license when the operation holds a significant possibility of international effects. Thus, where it seems clear that the weather modification program will be restricted in effect to the territory of the state
within which the operation is carried out, the international licensing
system would not be used.
We have already mentioned the question of the principles to be
applied in determining what are permissible uses of the new
technology. This question must be squarely confronted if a licensing
system is established because decisions concerning permissible use
must be made in advance of the issuance of the license.
A further issue is the nature and composition of the licensing body.
Should there be regional bodies to handle regional applications? It
will be recalled that in the discussion on permissible uses it was
mentioned that decisions on weather modification operations ought to
take into account a multiplicity of factors in order to determine
whether any particular operation will be to the betterment of
mankind in the broadest sense. The quality, rather than the quantity,
of life is important. This point finds its reflection in the composition of
a licensing body. If this multiplicity of factors must be considered,
then the persons on the licensing body must represent a wide range of
expertise. Decisions ought to be taken by a group which has in it
scientists, economists, lawyers, and so on. Furthermore, the composition must ensure that no one country or group of countries has so
predominant a part that decisions fail to mirror the international
community expectations. Developed and developing countries must
be represented. Most importantly, there must be representation from
both those countries which undertake weather operations or benefit
from them, and those States which incur the effects of their neighbors'
activities.
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In the Draft Protocol on Weather Modification,19 it was suggested
that if the international body grants permission for an operation
because, in its judgment, there would be benefit for mankind, then
there ought to be international compensation for the damage which
results, so long as the operation is properly carried out. In this way,
the burden of the loss is shared among all those who benefit. The
mechanics of this compensation have been discussed briefly already.
The question for us here is, what body should determine the amount
of compensation? In the Draft, it was suggested that the same body
which grants permission for operation should handle claims for
compensation. Commentary on this proposal has suggested that such a
dual role places the body in an impossible position. It is said that
there ought to be either a reference to the existing international
judicial system, or to a new specialized tribunal.
E. InternationalMonopoly On Operations
In the world of international make-believe, we could contemplate
an international monopoly on weather modification operations. All
programs would be conducted by an international body specially
established for this purpose.2 0 The agreement creating this organization would set out its functions and powers, the principles by which it
would operate, and the relationship between it and the States of the
world-and thereafter no State would undertake or permit to be
undertaken weather modification activities. The international monopoly could engage in programs which it thought desirable, or which it
was requested to perform by the U.N. In addition, the services of the
monopoly could be contracted out to States wishing weather modification.
If such a monopoly were established, it would seem clear that the
operations it would engage in would all be of a peaceful type. Even
fog-clearing to permit the take-off of military aircraft could not be
undertaken by an international body. It would be an invidious
situation if the organization facilitated the military endeavors of one
of the States. Because this is so, one can be fairly sceptical of the
possibility that we shall see the creation of such a body. States will not
give up such fog-clearing operations. And if they're permited to
perform this modification, why not rain-making on dry lands? One
19. Draft Protocol, supra note 2.
20. In Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Pacem in Maribus 75 (2 A Center
Occasional Paper), Arthur Barber outlines his plan for "An International Weather Corporation:
A Projected World Utility." In this fairly detailed proposal, Barber calls for the establishment of
a multinational consortium, chartered by the U.N., which would take over all the world's
weather obervation systems. While the proposal was concerned primarily with weather
prediction and analysis, the idea could be applied to modification.
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response would be to restrict the activities of the international
monopoly to all weather modification operations which have international consequences.
A fundamental problem in the establishment of an international
monopoly would be its relationship with the existing World Meteorological Organization. On the one hand, there is a body of international
expertise within the WMO and it would be convenient to merely
extend the functions and powers of this organization to permit it to
operate the monopoly. In this way, we would avoid the proliferation
of international institutions concerned with the weather. On the other
hand, the essential purpose of the WMO, as it is now, is to facilitate
international meteorological observation through the establishment of
services and systems, and the standardization of practices and
procedures. Basically then, the job that the WMO does keeps it out of
contentious matters. As has been pointed out, decisions concerning
permissible weather modification operations will necessarily be
difficult and at times contentious. For this reason, the WMO is rightly
concerned about being too involved in the control of weather
modification operations. It might be better to establish a new
international entity to hold the monopoly. But the future of weather
modification depends so greatly upon the very sort of services that
WMO provides. For this reason, if the WMO does not hold the
monopoly, it must be provided that the new organization call upon
the old for assistance. The key point is that decisions concerning
weather modification operations be made by the new entity.
If such an international control procedure was established, the
kinds of matters that would have to be dealt with in the creation
include:
-the principles upon which decisions concerning permissible
operations must be made;
-the composition of the body, taking into account the multiplicity of factors which must be considered in making decisions;
-the relationship of the new organization to the UN, to existing
specialized agencies such as WMO and FAO, to States;
-funding, including sources of income and distribution of surpluses;
-settlement of disputes between the institution and States;
-powers of the organization;
-the manner in which compensation is made to those injured by
the activities of the monopoly.
CONCLUSION
The critical point in all of this is that we stand on the threshold.
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Technology will shortly provide us with the capability to do great
good or great harm by means of weather modification. If we are to
have the former, and avoid the latter, then we must plan now for the
international control of weather modification operations. What has
been done briefly in this paper is an outline of some of the legal
principles and methods of control that could be adopted. Each one
requires a great deal of expansion and further exploration. This brief
examination was intended to lay the groundwork for later, more
detailed, discussion.
What can be done now? 2 1 It is unlikely that, until the precise shape
of future technological developments emerges, we can achieve
international agreement on any detailed control system. 22 However,
there are certain things that can be done now. We could establish a
reporting system whereunder States make regular reports to the
WMO on the weather modification activities for which they are
responsible. These reports could be examined by the Organization
and published. We could agree upon the need for international
consultation where there is a significant possibility of international
effects from weather-changing programs. This is often done now, it
ought to be made the rule. Finally, perhaps we could agree on some
international standards concerning permissible uses of weather
modification, liability of operators, and state responsibility in this
field.

21. The current work of the WMO is set out in World Meteorological Organization, Brief
Survey of the Activities of the World Meteorological Organization Relating to Human
Environment 9 (1970). See also Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 2, at 820-29, for a
discussion of international technical cooperation in weather to date, and suggested further
intergovernmental cooperation; Hassett, supra note 2, at 114-18.
22. While not willing in any way to withdraw the proposals I made in the Draft Protocolon
Weather Modification, supra note 2, it seems clear that this sort of thing is not yet possible. The
science is too uncertain for a full control scheme.

